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The North Carolina Court of Appeals indicated in Harris and
Brannon that a concern for opening a trial to issues "collateral to that of
guilt or innocence" of a defendant led it to adopt the rule against attacks
on credibility. 61 If that was its concern, the court should consider a
procedure such as the one followed in the Seventh Circuit, instead of
adopting the absolute rule against attacks on credibility. In most cases,
the court would accomplish its objective of avoiding a hearing on
collateral issues. Few defendants would pass the initial showing obsta-
cle, particularly in cases in which the court found no cause for requiring
police officers to disclose the identity of their informants. -02  Meanwhile,
the court would be following a procedure more in line with the constitu-
tional policies put forth by Mapp by granting review of credibility in the
most flagrant situations.
NANCY BENTSON ESSEX
Securities Regulation-Vicarious Liability For Securities Acts Vi-
olations-By Common Law or By Statute?
Congress regulated a variety of activities relating to the distribution
and trading of securities in the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. -  Each of these acts contains a provision
whereby one in "control"' of an individual who violates the acts' provi-
sions may also be held liable for the violation.4 This liability, however,
61. The court indicated this when it said: "To permit a defendant to challenge the
truth or accuracy of the factual averments of the affidavit, would open at trial an issue or
issues, theretofore judicially determined, collateral to that of guilt or innocence." 25
N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 416.
62. One court has argued that the initial showing requirement would not cut down
on the number of pretrial hearings. State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, -, 309
A.2d 135, 146 (1973). As long as the court required something more than mere
allegations to constitute a "showing," however, it would seem the threshold obstacle
would be a barrier to some and probably to most defendants.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
2. Id. §§ 78a-hh.
3. "Control" is an intentionally undefined term. The framers of the Securities
Exchange Act commented on its meaning: "It was thought undesirable to attempt to
define the term. It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the
many ways in which actual control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods
used are stock ownership, lease, contract and agency." H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 26 (1934).
4. Section 15 of the 1933 Act provides:
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is made subject to the defense that the controlling person was ignorant
of the violation or acted in "good faith."5  The federal judiciary has
occasionally faced the question whether the controlling persons provi-
sions afford the exclusive means of imputing liability for violations of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts to the violator's superiors, or whether vicarious
liability can also be predicated upon common-law principles of respon-
deat superior' or agency.7 Since common-law liability attaches regard-
less of the personal culpability of the master or principal, the issue is of
considerable practical importance. A distinct split has emerged from
those circuits in which the matter has been considered. In Zweig v.
Hearst Corp." the Ninth Circuit for the first time clearly held that
common-law principles of vicarious liability have no application to ac-
tions brought under the 1934 Act.9 As a consequence defendant Hearst
Corporation was afforded an opportunity to exculpate itself by proving
that it had "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act or acts constituting the violation."1
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding
with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title,
shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to be-
lieve in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such con-
trolled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless
the controlling person acted in good faith, and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
5. See final clauses of sections quoted in note 4 supra.
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 250-67 (1954).
7. See id. §§ 219-49. While vicarious liability based on a master-servant relation-
ship is distinct, both in terms of origin and effect, from that based on a principal-agent
relationship, both will be referred to in terms of "agency." See Ferson, Bases for
Master's Liability and For Principal's Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REv. 260
(1951).
8. 521 F.2d 1129 (9thCir. 1975).
9. The opinion in Zweig states that Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382
F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 801 (1968), provides controlling
authority for the decision. The Kamen opinion is rather cryptic, however, and its
ambiguity has been noted by both court and commentator. Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381
F. Supp. 71, 94 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Note, Vicarious Liability For Securities Law
Violations: Respondeat Superior and the Controlling Person Sections, 15 WM. & MAY
L. REv. 713,716 (1974).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). See note 4 supra.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Zweig v. Hearst Corp. resulted from the publication of a financial
column by defendant Hearst Corporation (hereinafter Hearst). This
column, authored by a longtime and apparently reliable employee of the
paper, praised the virtues of a publicly-held corporation. Undis-
closed was the fact that the columnist held some of the corporation's
stock. Subsequent to the publication of this laudatory column, the price
of the corporation's stock advanced dramatically. The financial writer
disposed of some or all of his stock at this higher price. The value of
the stock later declined. Suit was brought against both the columnist
and Hearst by a number of persons who alleged financial injury as a
consequence of the price fluctuation of the corporation's stock allegedly
resulting from the newspaper story. Plaintiffs contended that the wri-
ter's failure to disclose his interest in the company constituted a violation
of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act11 and Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.1 2 Vicarious liability was
asserted against Hearst based upon the employment relationship. Hearst
moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plain-
tiffs appealed, arguing that Hearst should be held liable for the acts of
its employee under an "agency theory of respondeat superior." The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this contention, relying on its
previous holding in Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.13 which
it characterized as follows:
Kamen appears to be the forerunner of a series of cases in
the various circuits treating with the liability of an employer where
an employee violates Section 10(b). It was there held that Section
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
12. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, promulgated under authority
of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
Beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946),
courts have recognized a private right of action for rule 10b-5 violations which result in
investor injury. Recognition of such a right is now virtually universal, and has received
the tacit endorsement of the Supreme Court. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIs REGULATION 3870-73
(1969).
13. 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
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20(a), the controlling person provision, is to be applied to deter-
mine such liability. The contention that the more stringent doc-
trine of respondeat superior remained effective to establish vicari-
ous liability was rejected.14
While the Ninth Circuit in Kamen and Zweig did not address
arguments that the statutory provision preempts the common law theo-
ries of liability, the issue has been the subject of judicial disagreement in
recent years. At least three circuits have concluded that vicarious
liability for violations of the Securities Acts can be predicated on com-
mon law principles. Of these, the Fifth Circuit adopted sub silentio a
non-exclusivity position, holding a brokerage firm liable for an employ-
ee's sale of unregistered securities on the basis of principles embodied in
the Restatement of Agency.15 The Seventh Circuit, in Fey v. Walston &
Co., Inc.,' similarly rejected arguments that the controlling persons
provision of the 1934 Act is exclusive, citing precedent that purportedly
recognized "that the mere existence of remedial provisions in the Securi-
ties Acts does not foreclose -the application of similar common law
remedies . . . . 17 The Fourth Circuit's stance, enunciated in Johns
Hopkins University v. Hutton,' hinges the non-exlusivity of the control-
ling persons sections on congressional intent and public policy. The
SEC has argued in favor of non-exclusivity for similar reasons.' 9
Cases in the Second and Ninth Circuits have reached contrary
results. In SEC v. Lum's, Inc. 0 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York determined that the controlling persons section of
the 1934 Act afforded the sole means of imputing an employee's rule
IOb-5 violation of his employer,"' relying partly on the Second Circuit's
decision in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.2" It was determined in the latter case
that the controlling persons provision provided the standard by which
the vicarious liability of corporate directors was to be determined.
14. 521 F.2d at 1132.
15. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
16. 493 F.2d 1036 (7thCir. 1974).
17. Id. at 1052n.18.
18. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970). The district court's position on the exclusivity issue was
adopted by the Fourth Circuit, however. See 422 F.2d at 1130.
19. Brief for SEC as amicus curiae at 13-14, 23, Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen
& Co., 390 U.S. 942 (1968), cited in, Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law
Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Par! Delicto, Indemnification, and
Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 597, at 606 n.37, 607 n.41 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
SEC Brief].
20. 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
21. See note 12 supra.
22. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Likewise, the Ninth Circuit's Kamen decision, recently clarified in
Zweig, now stands for the proposition that the controlling persons
section of the 1934 Act affords the exclusive basis for imputing liability
for rule 1 Ob-5 violations to the violator's employer.23
The facts in the Lanza and Zweig decisions are distinctive from
those in other cases because neither involved the typical situation:
vicarious liability asserted against a brokerage house for the Securities
Acts violations of its employees. While such factual differences may
contribute to the split in the circuits regarding the exclusivity question,
an explicit and controlling basis of disagreement has been a differing
perception of Congress's intent in enacting the controlling persons
sections. In Hopkins the district court concluded: "What legislative
history there is does not indicate that Congress intended Section 15 [of
the 1933 Act], originally or as amended, to serve as a limitation on
liability,"2 4 while the Second Circuit, analyzing the -history of the equiv-
alent section of the 1934 Act, observed that:
[t]he intent of Congress in adding this section, passed at the same
time as the amendment to Section 15 of the 1933 Act, was obvi-
ously to impose liability only on those directors ...who are in
some meaningful sense culpable participants in the fraud perpe-
trated by controlled persons.2 5
Attempts to discern Congress's intent in enacting the controlling
persons provisions seem unlikely to result in a definitive resolution
of the exclusivity issue. No evidence that Securities Acts draftsmen
considered the exclusivity question per se has come to light, and such a
failure of congressional foresight seems quite plausible if one accepts
Professor Ruder's arguments that Congress similarly failed to consider
whether the Acts contained an implied private right of action for
violations.20 The history of the control sections themselves affords no
clear insight into the purposes of Congress. Legislative reports indicate
that the control provision of the 1933 Act was enacted to thwart
23. 382 F.2d at 697. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
24. 297 F. Supp. at 1211.
25. 479 F.2d at 1299.
26. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963). Professor Ruder's argument, if correct, supports
the conclusion that Congress did not foresee the exclusivity question in two ways: it
comments on the general inability of the Securities Acts draftsmen to foresee the
reception their legislation would receive from the courts; it suggests that private actions
under the Acts were contemplated 'as purely statutory creatures, the common law
regarding vicarious liability having no more relevance thereto than would common law
defining an appropriate period of limitation. See also note 12 supra.
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securities violations by individuals operating through "dummies," 7 and
it may consequently be inferred that the controlling persons sections
were intended to only govern vicarious liability outside the usual em-
ployment situation .2  Yet, legislative reports also indicate that "agency"
was one relationship that "control" was meant to embrace, 9 thereby
giving rise to the inference that the control sections were intended to
govern situations in which an employee acts as an employer's agent.
Furthermore, because the Acts were frankly-recognized compro-
mises between the interests of the investing public and those of the
business community,3 any examination of congressional purpose be-
hind their enactment is likely to be similarly unenlightening. Refer-
ences to the goals of the legislators in passing the Acts can therefore be
used as a basis for arguing either side of the exclusivity question,
depending on which aspects of legislative history a particular court
chooses to emphasize. True effectuation of the purposes of the Securi-
ties Acts might better be attained through a balancing of interests of the
sort suggested by the history and structure of the Acts themselves.
Brokerage houses seem most commonly to be the parties against
whom vicarious liability is asserted in actions in which the exclusivity
issue has been raised. Brokerage firms are subject to the rules of the
SEC,' the various exchanges3 2 and NASD." Failure to comply with
27. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
28. Such was the position of the SEC in its brief. SEC Brief, supra note 19, at 14.
See Note, 15 WM. & MARY L. Rnv., supra note 9, at 721-22.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934). The control section of
the 1934 Act was apparently patterned after section 15 of the 1933 Act, and it may
consequently be inferred that congressional purposes were similar. See Note, 15 WM. &
NIARY L. REV., supra note 9, at 721.
30. In a March, 1933 message to Congress, President Roosevelt stated: "The
purpose of the legislation I seek is to protect the public with the least possible
interference to honest business." S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1933), H.R.
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). These dual purposes were also expressly
recognized by members of Congress. See Ruder, supra note 26, at 648 & n.112. The
balance between specifically permitted private actions, and the limitations which accom-
pany each, further evidences that the Acts are compromises between opposing interests.
See id. at 649-50.
31. 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.01-287.101 (1974).
32. Section 5 of the 1934 Act prohibits transactions on exchanges that are neither
registered with the SEC nor exempted by the Commission from such registration.
Registration involves the submission of exchange rules to the SEC. These rules must be
"just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors ...." (15 U.S.C. §
78f(d) (1970)), and must include provisions for disciplining a member for "conduct
or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade .... " Id. §
78f(b).
33. Rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers regulate transactions in
over-the-counter markets. 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1970).
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these rules has been found to preclude the "good faith" defense,84 and
could serve as the basis of an independent suit.8 5 Such firms, already
required by regulation to supervise thoroughly36 and hire carefully,81
seem already forced to do all in their power to prevent employees'
securities law violations. It is difficult to conceive of any further
precautions that might be taken as a consequence of the imposition of
strict liability for employees' misdeeds. Thus, with respect to this group
of litigants, absolute liability for employees' securities law violations
seems unlikely to serve any additional deterrence function.
While liability based on agency principles would not serve any
further deterrence purposes with respect to securities dealers, such a
liability standard would serve to guarantee to victims compensation for
their financial loss. Compensation was apparently a goal of the Securi-
,ties Acts.38 In cases in which a brokerage house so demonstrated the
adequacy of its supervision and care that a jury determined that the
brokerage firm acted in "good faith," compensation might be denied the
injured investor. In the Hopkins decision the district court stated:
If Hutton, as the defendant in this case, is not liable . . . for the
activities of . . .the manager of its oil and gas department, ...
then the partners in Hutton and in other brokerage houses like it
can seemingly escape all liability under 12(2) by the simple ex-
pedient of making certain "not to know or have reasonable grounds
34. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051 (7th Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 42
(10th Cir. 1971); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v.
Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp.
439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970).
35. See Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability To Its Customer For Violation
of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 253 (1970); Lowenfels,
Implied Liabilities Based on Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLuM. L. RaV. 12 (1966);
Lowenfels, Private Enforcement In The Over-the-Counter Markets: Implied Liabilities
Based On NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L. REv. 633 (1966); MacLean, Brokers' Liability
For Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DENY. L.J. 63 (1970); Note, Federal
Margin Requirements as a Basis For Civil Liability, 66 CoLuM. L. REv. 1462 (1966);
Note, Private Actions as a Remedy For Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 825 (1970).
36. See e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 342, American Stock Exchange Rule
320.
37. See e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 345, American Stock Exchange Rule
340 and comment .02 thereto.
38. Investor protection is a well-recognized purpose of the Acts. See, e.g., Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944), wherein Judge Clark pointed out thirty-six places where the 1934
Act refers to the goal of investor protection. That such protection entailed a right of
compensation for injury has served as a basis for the implication of a private right of
action under rule lob-5. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,
514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the lia-
bility . . is alleged to exist." Such a construction of Section 12
(2) and 15 would in effect mean that the partners in a brokerage
house who kept their eyes and ears closed to the fraudulent conduct
of one of their registered representatives, could reap the harvest of
that employee's conduct with impunity. Such a result would leave
investors with much shallower protection than was intended by
Congress in its passage of the '33 Act and the 1934 amendment
to Section 15.30
While it is doubtful that brokerage firms could behave with such
impunity, given the breadth of rule 10b-5 and prevailing interpretation
of the good faith defense,4" any protection of the firm's deeper pocket
when its customers are injured by employees' misdeeds requires justifi-
cation. Such justification might be found in the argument that the
customer looks to a brokerage firm not as guarantor of its employees'
honesty and capability, but as an organization that does all in its power
to assure such honesty and capability through careful employee selection
and supervision. When the firm fails to discharge these duties the
customer's recovery should be against the firm. Careful selection and
supervision is arguably all that the customer should expect of the firm,
however, and when an employee nonetheless wrongfully injures an
investor it is only to the employee that the customer should look for
recovery.
This argument does not seem compelling when it is remembered
that the firm profits from all business that its employees generate.4' But
decisions that seek to avoid such seeming inequity by hinging vicarious
liability for securities laws violations on agency theories will require the
application of agency principles in situations other than those involving
a broker-client relationship-situations in which vicarious liability seems
less appropriate. The potential liability that might attach to a general
circulation newspaper because of its financial columnist's actions and
recommendations is out of all proportion to the profits such a column
could generate. Further, it seems clear that a newspaper is in a much
poorer position to warrant the propriety of an employee's financial
dealings and advice than is a brokerage house comprised of securities
39. 297 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
40. See, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051 (7th Cir. 1974);
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1301 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Lun's Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1046, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Moerman v. Zipco, 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y.
1969).
41. Brokerage firms earn commissions which are roughly proportional to the
volume of trading undertaken on behalf of their customers,
1976] 495
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professionals. A financial columnist is a writer, not a broker or advisor.
His advice no more carries the newspaper's warrant than does that of
Ann Landers. It is the financial columnist himself, not the newspaper,
to whom readers should look for responsibility for the propriety of
analyses and recommendations. It therefore would be unfortunate if
agency principles, under which the newspaper would be held vicariously
liable as a consequence of the columnist's employment, should govern
such a situation.
Virtual strict liability may be imposed on brokerage firms by
reading the good faith defense to require extremely high supervisory
standards over brokerage employees. But wholesale application of
agency principles of vicarious liability to securities law violations would
render the good faith defense a near nullity and remove from courts the
ability to deny liability in circumstances such as those in the Zweig
case. With the growth of securities litigation it seems likely that vicar-
ious liability may be asserted against business enterprises that have an
even less direct relationship with the securities field than that of the
Hearst Corporation. Courts should continue to balance the interests
embodied in the Securities Acts, and should permit employers to avail
themselves of the exculpatory clauses of the Acts' controlling persons
provisions.
JAMES JEROME HARTZELL
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